ABSTRACT The widespread use of smart devices attracts much attention on the research for a mobile payment protocol in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). However, payment trust and user privacy still raise critical concerns to the application of mobile payments since existing authentication protocols for mobile payments either suffer from the heavy workload on a resource-limited smart device or cannot provide user anonymity in the mobile payment. To address these challenges elegantly, this paper presents a lightweight and privacy-preserving authentication protocol for mobile payment in the context of IoT. First, we put forward a unidirectional certificateless proxy re-signature scheme, which is of independent interest. Based on this signature scheme, this paper, then, gives a new mobile payment protocol that for the first time not only achieves anonymity and unforgeability but also leaves low resource consumption on smart devices. In the proposed protocol, the efficiency is notably improved by placing the most computational cost on Pay Platform (usually with abundant computational power) instead of lightweight mobile devices. Moreover, by considering that the Pay Platform and Merchant Server needs to perform computation for each transaction, the idea of batch-verification has been adopted to mitigate the overhead for millions of users at the Pay Platform and Merchant Server to address the scalability issue. Through the formal security analysis presented in this paper, the proposed protocol is proved to be secure under the extended CDH problem. In addition, the performance evaluation shows that the proposed protocol is feasible and efficient for the resource-limited smart devices in the IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development and pervasiveness of mobile communication technology [1] , [2] , mobile smart devices (i.e., smartphones or laptops) are widely used in daily life. This leads to an increasing number of requirements for various online services. As an important part of online services, mobile payments also get a lot of attentions so that many applications of mobile payments are developed, such as, Ali pay [3] , Apple pay [4] , WeChat pay [5] and so on. Nowadays, no matter where a user is, s/he could use these online transaction applications to buy many products and online services. However, when an online transaction is started, the messages used to ensure validity of transaction often contain user's private identity information that is revealed to merchants. Considering the unreliability and greediness of merchants, they may sell goods that user doesn't need or just sell user's identity to third parties for commercial profit. On the other hand, a merchant must possess the ability to verify the legality and validity of a transaction message, so s/he could assure the goods or services are provided to correct user. In addition, the verification on transaction message can prevent user make the allegation that s/he didn't buy the goods or services. To meet these security requirements, many protocols for mobile payments are proposed based on cryptographic primitives. Their protocols achieve the most important secure requirements mentioned above, i.e., user anonymity and unforgeability. When a protocol provides user anonymity, any merchants and adversaries can't link a transaction message to a user's identity. And unforgeability means the source of a message can be detected and any parties can't forge other parities' transaction message without being detected.
In addition to security requirements, efficiency also needs to be concerned in a mobile payment protocol. The rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) [6] - [8] inevitably changes peoples lifestyle, so online payments via a variety of smart devices need to be considered. For example, smart meters could pay for electricity automatically, smart headphones could pay for digital music online when needed, and so on. All these devices including widely used smartphones face a common problem that their computation power and storage space are limited. Thus, when a payment protocol implements, the involved computation and necessary storage space should be low for the resource-constrained devices. However, in traditional transaction protocols, a public key infrastructure (PKI) is introduced to issue certificates for public key of the user. Particularly, the validity of the public key can be verified based on the certificates issued by a certificate authority. It is easy to see that PKI caused a lot of communication and storage costs when the revocation, storage, and distribution of certificates are done. So there exists a contradiction between PKI and mobile smart devices which only have limited computation power and storage space especially in the context of IoT. So how to design a mobile transaction protocol that not only suffer from certificates for public key, but also consumes few resources including computation power, communication traffic and storage space is still a challenge.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
To solve the above challenge, we propose a new mobile payment scheme that achieves anonymity, unforgeability and low resource consumption simultaneously. In a nutshell, the major contributions of this paper are three-fold: (1) We propose the first unidirectional certificateless proxy re-signature scheme. It is of independent interest; (2) A mobile payment protocol with user anonymity is presented based on our proposed scheme. In particular, Pay Platform is introduced as a trusted proxy on behalf of users to interact with Merchant Server securely. Therefore, it is more secure for users because they need not send or receive messages to merchants directly. And resource consumption on the user side is reduced because the main computation is performed on Pay Platform. In addition, certificateless public key encryption technique and proxy resignature scheme are introduced to achieve anonymity, and signature for every transaction information is used to achieve unforgeability. Moreover, the computation, communication and storage space costs are acceptable for resource limited mobile smart devices in the context of IoT; (3) By considering that the Pay Platform and Merchant Server needs to perform computation for each transaction, the overhead for millions of users at the Pay Platform and Merchant Server should be drastically reduced to address the scalability issue. It is easy to observe the signature verification dominate computation time at the Pay Platform and Merchant Server side. Inspired by [14] and [15] , the idea of batch-verification have been utilized to accelerate the signature verification such that multiple signatures from different users (signers) on distinct messages can be verified quickly. Moreover, the signatures from the same user can be further batched to achieve higher efficiency. (4) We implement the presented protocol and compare it with other existing mobile payment protocol. The result of comparison shows our protocol is feasible and efficient in the context of IoT.
B. RELATED WORKS 1) CERTIFICATELESS PROXY RE-SIGNATURES
Digital signature [16] , which enables authenticating messages or documents in a manner that repudiation is disallowed, has been widely utilized to secure software distribution, e-commerce, e-government, and a host of other scenarios. Proxy re-signature, which was initialized in 1998 by Blaze et al. as the extension of standard digital signature [17] - [19] , enables a semi-trusted proxy to convert a signature from delegatee into a signature from delegator on the same message by employing the re-signing key. However, the proxy is not able to sign any message on behalf of either delegator or delegatee. Featured with conversion property, proxy re-signature has been applied in plenty of applications including certificate management simplification and group signature formation. In the conventional proxy re-signature scheme, the public keys of the delegator and delegatee need to be certified by the digital certificate (a digital signature issued by a trusted third party in essence) prior to the verification of signature itself. To mitigate the heavy costs incurred by the digital certificates, identity-based proxy re-signature [20] has been introduced such that the public key of the signer can be effortlessly calculated from his/her publicly known identity. Nevertheless, one notorious and inherent disadvantage of identity-based proxy re-signature is called ''key escrow'' [21] where the private key of the delegatee/delegator is generated by a fully trusted private key generator. To solve both the certificates management and key escrow problem, proxy resignature has naturally been studied in the certificateless cryptography [22] , [34] , [35] , which is usually considered as an intermediate between traditional [23] and identitybased [24] public key cryptography. The only know certificateless proxy re-signature [25] is bi-directional such that the proxy can perform the conversion in two-directions. According to [18] - [20] , an array of practical applications motivate the construction of proxy re-signature with unidirectional property. As far as we know, the construction of certificateless unidirectional proxy re-signature still remains open.
2) MOBILE PAYMENT PROTOCOLS
With the popularization of smartphones, research about secure mobile payments [26] gets wide-spread attention. In 2010, Kamijo et al. [27] proposed a SMS-based faceto-face mobile payment protocol which supports anonymity, security, and usability simultaneously. In their protocol, unique information, such as the location and the time, for the payment transaction is used to ensure the security of the transaction, but their protocol only works well for face-toface payment. Then Sureshkumar et al. [28] proposed an efficient mobile transaction protocol that achieves remote payment. They adopt symmetric key operations as well as hash functions to realize untraceability, unlinkability and atomicity, and use two gateways to enhance the efficiency of the whole system. However, Sureshkumar et al. ' s protocol cannot provide non-repudiation, which is very important in remote payment. Afterwards, Yang and Lin [29] presented a new mobile payment protocol that provides the unforgeability and anonymity. Although the costs for transaction in their protocol are small, the costs for certificates which are used to guarantee the validity and legality of the public keys are very high for the resource-limited devices in the context of IoT.
By considering the great benefits brought from the cloud computing [11] , [12] , Qin et al. [13] and Yeh [9] proposed secure mobile payment protocols based on certificateless cryptographic primitives respectively. The protocol proposed by Qin et al. provides anonymity, unforgeability and certificate-free property. Liao et al. [30] ' protocols will produce multiple pseudo identities to hide the real user identity, so a lot of storage spaces are consumed on the resource-limited users. Most recently, Yeh [9] proposed a transaction protocol based on certificateless cryptographic primitives. In Yeh's protocol, an efficient certificateless signature which does not need any certificate to ensure the legality of public key and private key pairs is adopted to achieve secure transaction. In a nutshell, Yeh's protocol has made great progress in the mobile payment protocol that we can complete the transaction protocol at anytime and anywhere efficiently in smartphones.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAPS
Here we use G 1 and G 2 to denote two cyclic additive groups with order q. And P is a generator of G 1 . If e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, it should satisfy the following conditions: 1) Bilinearity, that is, for ∀x, y ∈ Z q , the equation e(xP, yP) = e(P, P) xy should be hold; 2) Non-degeneracy, that is, e(P, P) = 1.
B. FRAMEWORK OF CERTIFICATELESS PROXY RE-SIGNATURE
The unidirectional certificateless proxy re-signature scheme consists of the following eight algorithms:
• Setup: On input the security parameter k, the algorithm generates the master secret key msk, the master public key PK pub and the system parameters params.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: On input the system parameters params and an identity ID of the user, the algorithm generates the user's partial private key D ID .
• Set-Secret-Value: On input the system parameters params and an identity ID of the user, the algorithm generates the user's secret value x ID .
• Set-Public-Key: On input the system parameters params and the user's secret value x ID , the algorithm generates the user's public key P ID .
• ReKey: On input the system parameters params, the delegatee's identity ID i and public key P i , as well as the delegator's secret key (D j , x j ) associated with the identity ID j and public key P j , the algorithm generates the re-signature key rk i,j .
• Sign: On input the system parameters params, a message m the user's secret key (D ID , x ID ) associated with the identity ID and public key P ID , the algorithm generates two kinds of signatures σ on message m.
• ReSign: On input the re-signature key rk i,j , the delegatee's public key P i and a signature σ i on message m with the identity ID i , the algorithm generates the re-signature σ j on message m with the identity ID j .
• Verify: On input the system parameters params and the user's public key P ID , the algorithm checks the validity of signature σ on message m under the identity ID. If σ is valid, the algorithm outputs 1; ⊥, otherwise.
C. SYSTEM MODEL OF OUR TRANSACTION PROTOCOL
The considered system consists of four types of entities: the trusted system authority (TSA), the user app, the merchant server, and the Pay Platform [9] .
• Trusted System Authority: TSA is a trusted third party organization that provides registration services for User's App and Pay Platform. At the same time, TSA also distributes system params and partial private keys for registered users to ensure the whole scheme successfully works.
• User's App: Any software that requires a payment function is called User's App, such as, Ali pay [3] , Apple pay [4] , WeChat pay [5] and so on. This application needs to be registered with the TSA to obtain the corresponding system params and partial private key. Besides, it also generates its own user secret value and public key. Then User's App completes the signature using its full private key, which consists of partial private key.
• Pay Platform: Pay Platform is an application offered by a trusted party, of course, it also needs to register with the TSA to obtain system params and private key. Simultaneously, in order to protect the user's information of the transaction, Pay Platform will provide re-sign service, that is, the Pay Platform transforms signature of User's App into signature of Pay Platform.
• Merchant Server: Merchant Server is the entity which provides the goods or services, verifies the correctness of the transaction information to ensure the goods or services are provided to the corresponding user.
D. OBJECTIVES OF OUR TRANSACTION PROTOCOL
To resist the potential threats in the process of transaction, a secure transaction should should meet the following requirements.
(1) User Anonymity: The real identities of users cannot be revealed by anyone except Pay Platform.
(2) Unforgeability: All the transaction information cannot be forged by anyone, that is, every receiver can verify the correctness of the received information.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS OF OUR TRANSACTION SCHEME
A. OUR UNIDIRECTIONAL CL-PRS SCHEME
1) Setup:
With a security data k and a prime number q, KGC generates two group G 1 and G 2 with order q, and then chooses a generator P of G 1 as well as a bilinear pairing e :
Next, KGC selects a secret key s ∈ Z * q and calculates the public key PK pub = s · P. After that, KGC chooses three secure hash function 
as his/her secret value. 4) Set-Public-Key: With params and x i , u i calculates P i = x i · P and sets P i as his/her public key. 5) Re-Key: With the delegatee's identity ID i and public key P i , as well as the delegator's secret key (D j , x j ) associated with identity ID j and public key P j , the delegator computes
as re-signature key. 1 6) Sign: With params, user secret key (D i , x i ), user public key P i , identity ID i and message m, u i is able to generate two kinds of signatures as follows:
• Level 2:
message m under the identity ID i and user public key P i , a re-signature key rk i,j , this algorithm is able to transform the signature σ i into a level 2 signature σ j on the same message m under the identity ID j and user public key (P j , R j ) as follows.
• Checks whether e(P, σ i1 ) = e(H 3 (m), σ i2 + h i PK pub + k i P i ) holds or not, if this equation holds, performs the following steps; otherwise, outputs failure.
•
It is easy to see σ j is a valid signature at level 2 on message m under the identity ID j and user public key P j . 8) Verify: With params, a signature σ i on message m under identity ID i and user public key P i , this algorithm is performed to check the validity of signature:
• Level 1: If e(P, σ i1 ) = e(H 3 (m), σ i2 + h i PK pub + k i P i ) holds, accept this signature; otherwise, outputs failure.
• Level 2: If e(P, σ i1 ) = e(H 3 (m), σ i2 + h i PK pub + k i P i ) and e(P, σ i2 ) = e(σ i3 , σ i4 + h i PK pub + k i P i ) hold, accept this signature; otherwise, outputs failure.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Lemma 1: With a Type I adversary A 1 breaking the security of the proposed CL-PRS scheme in the EUF-CL-PRS-CMA-I game, an algorithm is able to be constructed to solve the extCDH problem efficiently.
Lemma 2: With a Type II adversary A 2 breaking the security of the proposed CL-PRS scheme in the EUF-CL-PRS-CMA-II game, an algorithm is able to be constructed to solve the extCDH problem efficiently.
IV. OUR LIGHTWEIGHT AND ANONYMOUS TRANSACTION SCHEME
Similar to [9] , four entities including the KGC, the Merchant Server, the Android Pay platform and the user with Android App are involved in our transaction scheme, which consists of system initialization and transaction process phases. 1) System Initialization. A trusted system authority (shorten as TSA) provided by the Google Play Services is responsible to initialize the system and serve as KGC for all entities in the system. With a security parameter k and a prime number q, TSA generates two group G 1 and G 2 with order q, and then chooses a generator P of G 1 as well as a bilinear pairing e :
Next, TSA selects a secret key s ∈ Z * q and calculates the public key PK pub = s · P. After that, TSA chooses three secure hash function
{0, 1} * → G 1 and publishes {G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, PK pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } and preserves s secretly. Before performing the mobile payment, the user with identity ID i needs to register with TSA using his/her Android app as follows.
• The user with identity ID i selects a random number
x ID i ∈ Z * q as his/her user secret value and calculates P ID i = x ID i · P as his/her corresponding user public key.
• TSA selects a random number r ID i ∈ Z * q , and computes 
Similarly, the Android Pay Platform with identity ID AP needs to register with TSA as follows before providing the payment services for the requested users.
• The Android Pay Platform with identity ID AP selects a random number x ID AP ∈ Z * n as his/her user secret value and calculates P ID AP = x ID AP · P as his/her corresponding user public key.
• TSA selects a random number r ID AP 
Then it chooses a random number a i ∈ z * p and computes C 1 = rP as well as 
i,j = R j , t i is randomly chosen from Z * q and t j = t i ·(k i x i +s i )/(k j x j +s j ). Then it sends message FW , σ j securely to the merchant server. e) After receiving (FW , σ j ), the merchant server checks the validity of it as follows: with params, ID i , P i , FW, σ j , the server checks whether e(P, σ j1 ) = e(H 3 (FW ), σ j2 + h j PK pub + k j P j ) and e(P, σ j2 ) = e(σ j3 , σ j4 + h j PK pub + k j P j ). After the verification phase ends, the merchant records the transaction information and provides corresponding services.
A. BATCH VERIFICATION
We introduce a batch verification [14] to reduce the computation overhead in the verification phase. Here, we take the verification phase on Pay Platform as an example, and it is similar for Merchant Server. BatchVerify: When obtaining the signatures σ i = (σ i1 , σ i2 ) on distinct Full Wallet FW i for i = 1, . . . , n, Pay Platform first check each user public key P i is valid. If so, Pay Platform randomly selects a vector θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ), where θ i ∈ Z q is of bits. Then Pay Platform checks that e(P, FW 1 , P 1 ) , . . . , (σ n , FW n , P n ) = 1. This is derived from the verification equation of the proposed scheme:
The technique to prove the small exponents test in [15] is used to accomplish this proof as follows. We define σ 1i = a i P, H (FW ) = b i P, (σ i2 + h i PK pub + k i P i ) = c i P for some a i , b i , c i ∈ Z q . Now, the above equation can be written as
Suppose that BatchVerify((σ 1 , FW 1 , P 1 ), . . . , (σ n , FW n , P n ) = 1, but the equation BatchVerify (σ i , FW i , P i ) = 0 holds for at least one i. Without loss of generality, suppose that it is true for i = 1, that is, β 1 = 0. And we can easily get an inverse ξ 1 of β 1 such that β 1 ξ 1 ≡ 1(mod q) since q is a prime. So we can get:
Given (σ i , FW i , P i ) for i = 1, . . . , n, Ev is an event that BatchVerify(σ 1 , FW 1 , P 1 ) = 0 holds but BatchVerify ((σ 1 , FW 1 , P 1 ) , . . . , (σ n , FW n , P n ) also equals 1, namely, the batch verification is broken. We define = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) and denote the last n − 1 values of as = θ 2 , . . . , θ n with the number as | |. The above Equation can be comprehended that given a fixed vector , only one unique value of θ 1 will make Ev happen. That is to say, the probability of Ev is Pr[Ev| ] = 2 − with a randomly picked θ 1 . So if θ 1 is selected at random and all possible choices of are considered, the probability that event Ev appears is 
B. SECURITY STRENGTH OF OUR TRANSACTION PROTOCOL
Theorem 2 (User Anonymity): Anonymity in our protocol means that except for the user and the Pay Platform, any outsider (including the TSA) is unable to link a transaction message to a particular identity.
Proof: In our transaction protocol, the anonymity for user is achieved by the certificateless encryption and proxy re-signature. On the one hand, user ID i sends the encrypted signature and transaction information (C1, C2) to Pay Platform ID AP . Then Pay Platform uses its full private key (x ID AP , s ID AP , R ID AP ) to decrypt the encrypted message and use user's ID i as well as user's public key P i to verify the correctness of the transaction. So, anyone other than ID i and Pay Platform can not know the identity of ID i at this stage.
On the other hand, after verifying the transaction information, Pay Platform use its full private key (x ID AP , s ID AP , R ID AP ) to re-sign the signature σ i of ID i to σ j . Then it sends σ j and corresponding transaction information to Merchant Server. Finally, Merchant Server verifies the received message under the Pay Platform's public key and identity. So, the message cannot be linked to identity of ID i by the Merchant Server in this stage. In general, the user identity associated to transaction will not be revealed in the whole process.
Theorem 3 (Unforgeability): No PPT adversary can forge transaction information without being detected.
Proof: It should be noted that the signature and re-signature in our transaction protocol are proved secure in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. So here we assume unforgeability under signature and re-signature is guaranteed. In our transaction protocol, TSA only generate partial private key for users and Pay Platform so that TSA cannot forge a correct signature without full private key. Although Pay Platform can get user's signature and transaction information, it dosen't possess user's full private key. And Merchant Server only receives re-signed transaction from Pay Platform, so it cannot know the user's identity as well as full private key. In conclusion, no adversary including TSA, Pay Platform and Merchant Server can forge transaction information with non-negligible advantage.
C. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS PROTOCOLS
In this section, a performance evaluation is shown by comparing our proposed protocol with some other protocols in the aspect of function and computation efficiency. The comparison result of the function is shown in Table 1 , which includes: Anonymity, Undeniable, Certificateless and Storage overhead (the storage space required by the user' App). As for the comparison of computation efficiency, our experiment was performed on a computer equipped with an Intel i3-380M processor running at 2.53GHz and 8GB memory, and the simulation platform of the User's App client is set as an Intel PXA270 624-MHz processor and 1GB memory. PXA270 is a very powerful embedded processor and has a very rich expansion interface ,simultaneously, its energy consumption is also very low. So we chose it as the processor of User's App client for our experiment. For the overall security of our protocol, our hash function will use SHA-3. We implemented our protocol in VC++ 6.0 with PBC library [38] , and set the size of G 1 and Z q to 64B (512bits), as well as, we set the size of G 2 to 128B (1024bits). To offer the security with the equivalent level and achieve the comparable level of security to 2048 bits RSA in our scheme, we used the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x defined on F q 2 providing ECC group. With the above setting, we can get the result shown in table 3. We divide those protocols which we proposed and previous protocol into three parts: User's App computation efficiency, Pay Platform computation efficiency and Merchant Server computation efficiency. We calculate their respective computation efficiency. The computation efficiency result is shown in table 2, and in table 4 we give the storage overhead of different protocols.
From Fig. 2 , we can note that the computation cost of User's App phase in our protocol is nearly to other protocols. It means that our protocol is also suitable for using in lightweight devices. Our extensive computation cost is in the Pay Platform phase and it is easy to observe the signature verification dominate computation time at the Pay Platform and Merchant Server side. We use batch verification [14] , [15] in our protocol to accelerate the signature verification. Theoretic analysis and experiment evaluation demonstrate that our batch verification improves the computational efficiency at the Pay Platform and Merchant Server significantly. The result is shown in Fig.3 and Fig. 4. From Fig. 5 , we can see our protocol consumes very little on the terminal storage space compared with the protocol in [13] and the storage cost can't be ignored for lightweight devices. Overall, the protocol in [13] consumes a lot of storage space and fails to achieve the desirable security properties. Different from existing work, our proposed protocol for the first time achieve a trade-off between the security and performance requirements. Taking account of the untrusted network and limited computing power of smart device in the context of IoT, our protocol is more suitable than existing transaction protocols.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have presented a lightweight and anonymous authentication protocol for mobile payment by using a new certificateless unidirectional signature scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first transaction protocol that achieves user anonymity, unforgeability, certificateless and low resource cost on resource-limited smart device. Furthermore, the newly proposed certificateless unidirectional signature scheme, which is proven secure under the extended CDH assumption by using random oracle model, is also of independent interest. According to the results of our experiments, we can observe that our mobile payment transaction is very efficient and highly practical.
APPENDIX A ADVERSARY MODEL FOR CLS
The security of a CLS scheme is modeled via the following two games between a challenger and an adversary A 1 or A 2 .
Game 1: Game 1 is a secure game between a challenger C and a Type I adversary A 1 interacting within a CLS game. 
APPENDIX B SECURITY MODEL OF CERTIFICATELESS PROXY RE-SIGNATURE
The security of a CL-PRS scheme is modeled via the following two games between a challenger and an adversary A 1 or A 2 . Game 1: 1. Initial. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns the system parameters params and the master public key PK pub . The system parameters params is given to A 1 , but keep the master public key PK pub secret.
2. Attack. In this phase, A 1 can adaptively access all the oracles which are defined as follows:
• Public-Key Queries: A 1 can request a user's public key with the identity ID i . In response, the challenger outputs the public key P i with identity ID i .
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract Queries: A 1 can request a user's partial private key with the identity ID i . In response, the challenger outputs the partial private key D i of this user.
• Public-Key-Replace Queries: For any user with the identity ID i , A 1 can select a new public key P i as the new public key of this user. The challenger records this replacement.
• Secret-Value-Extract Queries: A 1 can request a user's secret value with the identity ID i . In response, the challenger outputs the secret value x i of this user.
• Re-Sign, Re-Key and Sign Queries: The challenger first queries Secret-Value and Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracles to obtain the partial private key and the secret key and then utilizes both key to answer these queries. 1. Initial. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns the system parameters params and the master public key PK pub . The system parameters params and the master public key PK pub are given to A 2 .
2. Attack. In this phase, A 2 can adaptively access all the oracles which are defined as follows:
• Public-Key Queries: A 2 can request a user's public key with the identity ID i = ID * . In response, the challenger outputs the public key P i of this user.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract Queries: A 2 can request a user's partial private key with the identity ID i . In response, the challenger outputs the partial private key D i of this user.
• Public-Key-Replace Queries: For any user with the identity ID i , A 2 can select a new public key P i as the new public key of this user. The challenger records this replacement.
• Secret-Value-Extract Queries: A 2 can request a user's secret value with the identity ID i = ID * . In response, the challenger outputs the secret value x i of this user.
• Re-Sign, Re-Key and Sign Queries: The challenger first queries Secret-Value and Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracles to obtain the partial private key and the secret key and then utilizes both key to answer these queries. 3. Forgery. A 2 outputs a valid forged signature σ * on message m * under identity ID * and the corresponding public key P ID * . We say that A 2 wins Game 2, if 1) A 2 has never requested the Secret-Value of the user with the identity ID * . 2) A 2 has never requested the Public-Key-Replace of the user with the identity ID * . 3) A 2 has never requested the Sign Queries of (σ * , m * , ID * , P ID * ).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: If an adversary A 1 breaking the security of the proposed unidirectional CL-PRS scheme in the EUF-CL-PRS-CMA-I game is given, a challenger can be built to solve the CDH problem. With the extCDH instance (aP, bP) as input, the aim of the challenger is to output (Q, abQ), where a, b are randomly chosen from Z * q and Q is chosen from G 1 randomly. To make the security proof reader-friendly, a brief description for this process is presented in Fig. 6. 1) Initial. The challenger assigns PK pub = aP and publishes the public parameters {G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, PK pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } to A 1 . 2) Attack. In this phase, the challenger maintains four initially-empty lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , PK and answers the adaptive queries issued by A 1 as follows.
• H 1 Queries: Once obtaining the query (ID i , R i ) from A 1 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 1 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 1i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses h 1i from Z * q at random and inserts
Finally, the challenger responds h 1i as the answer.
• H 2 Queries: Once obtaining the query (ID i , P i , R i ) from A 1 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 2 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 2i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses h 2i from Z * q at random and inserts
Finally, the challenger responds h 2i as the answer.
• H 3 Queries: Once obtaining the query m i from A 1 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 3 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 3i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses α i from Z * q at random and calculates h 3i = α i · (bP). Finally, the challenger inserts < m i , α i , h 3i > in L 3 and responds h 3i as the answer.
• Public-Key Queries: Once obtaining the query ID i from A 1 , the challenger searches this item in the list PK. If this item is found, the challenger responds P i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses x i from Z * q at random and inserts < ID i , x i , P i = x i P > in PK. Finally, the challenger responds P i as the answer.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract Queries: Once obtaining the query ID i from A 1 , the challenger searches ID i in the list L 1 . If this item exists, the challenger aborts. Otherwise, the challenger chooses β, s i from Z * q at random and computes R i = s i P − βPK pub and inserts < (ID i , R i ), β > in L 1 . Finally, (s i , R i ) is returned as the answer.
• Public-Key-Replace Queries: Once obtaining the query (ID i , P i ) from A 1 , the challenger searches the list PK with ID i and updates the corresponding tuple as < ID i , ⊥, P i >.
• Secret-Value-Extract Queries: Once obtaining the query ID i from A 1 , the challenger searches this item in the list PK. If this item is found, the challenger responds x i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses x i from Z * q at random and inserts < ID i , x i , P i = x i P > in PK. Finally, the challenger responds x i as the answer.
• Re-Sign, Re-Key and Sign Queries: The challenger first queries Secret-Key-Extract and Partial-Private-Key-Extract oracles to obtain the partial private key and the secret key and then utilizes both key to answer these queries. 3) Forgery. In accordance with the forking lemma [37] , if a valid forged signature σ * on message m * under identity ID * and public key P * i is output by A 1 , then the challenger can utilize A 1 as a sub-algorithm to generate two valid signature transcripts as follows.
• Level 1: (s ID * , R ID * , x ID * , σ i1 , σ i2 , m * ) and (s ID * , R ID * , x ID * , σ i1 , σ i2 , m * ) under identity ID * and public key P * i . In this way, the challenger is able to solve the extCDH problem by calculating (h i1 − h i1 ) −1 (σ i1 − σ i1 ) = (h i1 − h i1 ) −1 ((k i x i + r i + h i · a) − (k i x i + r i + h i · a))α i bP = α i abP. Then, (α i P, ab(α i P)) is output as the solution, where h i1 , h i1 are two different response from H 1 on input (ID i , R i ) and α i is the value associated with m * in table L 3 .
• Level 2: (s ID * , R ID * , x ID * , σ i1 , σ i2 , σ i3 , σ i4 , m * ) and (s ID * , R ID * , x ID * , σ i1 , σ i2 , σ i3 , σ i4 , m * ) under identity ID * and public key P * i . In this way, the challenger is able to solve the extCDH problem by calculating (h i1 − h i1 ) −1 (σ i1 − σ i1 ) = (h i1 − h i1 ) −1 t i ((k i x i +r i +h i ·a)−(k i x i +r i +h i ·a))α i bP = t i α i abP. Then, (α i σ i3 , abα i σ i3 ) is output as the solution, where h i1 , h i1 are two different response from H 1 on input (ID i , R i ) and α i is the value associated with m * in table L 3 .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: If an adversary A 2 breaking the security of the proposed unidirectional CL-PRS scheme in the EUF-CL-PRS-CMA-II game is given, a challenger can be built to solve the extCDH problem. With the extCDH instance (aP, bP) as input, the aim of the challenger is to output (Q, abQ), where a, b are randomly chosen from Z * q and Q is chosen from G 1 randomly. To make the security VOLUME 7, 2019 proof reader-friendly, a brief description for this process is presented in Fig. 7 . 
1)
Initial. The challenger selects s from Z * q at random and assigns PK pub = sP. Then the challenger publishes the public parameters {G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, PK pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } to A 2 . 2) Attack. In this phase, the challenger maintains four initially-empty lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , PK and answers the adaptive queries issued by A 1 as follows.
• H 1 Queries: Once obtaining the query (ID i , R i ) from A 2 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 1 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 1i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses h 1i from Z * q at random and inserts < (ID i , R i ), h 1i > in L 1 . Finally, the challenger responds h 1i as the answer.
• H 2 Queries: Once obtaining the query (ID i , P i , R i ) from A 2 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 2 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 2i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses h 2i from Z * q at random and inserts < (ID i , P i , R i , PK pub ), h 2i > in L 2 . Finally, the challenger responds h 2i as the answer.
• H 3 Queries: Once obtaining the query m i from A 2 , the challenger searches this item in the list L 3 . If this item is found, the challenger responds h 3i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses α i from Z * q at random and calculates h 3i = α i · bP. Finally, the challenger inserts < m i , α i , h 3i > in L 3 and responds h 3i as the answer.
• Public-Key Queries: Once obtaining the query ID i = ID * from A 2 , the challenger searches this item in the list PK. If this item is found, the challenger responds P i as the answer; otherwise, the challenger chooses x i from Z * q at random and inserts < ID i , x i , P i = x i ·(aP) > in PK. Then, the challenger responds P i as the answer. Once obtaining the query ID * from A 1 , the challenger inserts < ID * , ⊥, aP > in PK and responds aP as the answer. solution, where k i , k i are two different response from H 2 on input (ID i , P i , R i , PK pub ) and α i is the value associated with m * in table L 3 .
